Comments for Useful Security http://www.usefulsecurity.com Solving real security problems that matter to real users Sat, 17 May 2008 19:22:30 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.5 Comment on Apple Sandboxes Part 1 by c-had http://www.usefulsecurity.com/2007/11/apple-sandboxes-part-1/#comment-29 c-had Fri, 07 Dec 2007 22:09:24 +0000 http://www.usefulsecurity.com/?p=21#comment-29 I don't think I quite understand your comment. Most user applications (including at least iTunes, QuickTime, and iLife) run as non-root users. If they're using Mach system calls, then they have the appropriate mach port rights to do so (note that Mach does not utilize the UNIX UID concept, but rather utilizes the Mach port capability system. More info here - http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Security/Conceptual/Security_Overview/Concepts/chapter_3_section_9.html). More importantly, the new sandbox mechanism is an orthogonal mechanism to the current UNIX DAC model and the Mach port model, so sandbox policies can be applied (in a flexible way) regardless of whether the process is running as root. If you look at my examples in the second part of this post, those can be run as a regular user or as root and receive the same confinement. With sandboxes, root doesn't actually matter. I don’t think I quite understand your comment. Most user applications (including at least iTunes, QuickTime, and iLife) run as non-root users. If they’re using Mach system calls, then they have the appropriate mach port rights to do so (note that Mach does not utilize the UNIX UID concept, but rather utilizes the Mach port capability system. More info here - http://developer.apple.com/documentation/Security/Conceptual/Security_Overview/Concepts/chapter_3_section_9.html).

More importantly, the new sandbox mechanism is an orthogonal mechanism to the current UNIX DAC model and the Mach port model, so sandbox policies can be applied (in a flexible way) regardless of whether the process is running as root. If you look at my examples in the second part of this post, those can be run as a regular user or as root and receive the same confinement. With sandboxes, root doesn’t actually matter.

]]> Comment on Apple Sandboxes Part 1 by Joseph http://www.usefulsecurity.com/2007/11/apple-sandboxes-part-1/#comment-28 Joseph Fri, 07 Dec 2007 19:43:43 +0000 http://www.usefulsecurity.com/?p=21#comment-28 The reason apple has selected for an opt-in style of sandboxing is because much of the MACH related system calls expect to have root level access and since much of the OS and supported apps (include iTunes, QuickTime, iLife, ARD, etc) use the mac system and these "private api"s (which also expect root access) it would be impossible for Apple to roll this interface out as a required interface for at least 1 or 2 more OS releases from now. The reason apple has selected for an opt-in style of sandboxing is because much of the MACH related system calls expect to have root level access and since much of the OS and supported apps (include iTunes, QuickTime, iLife, ARD, etc) use the mac system and these “private api”s (which also expect root access) it would be impossible for Apple to roll this interface out as a required interface for at least 1 or 2 more OS releases from now.

]]> Comment on Montavista Vision 2007 by c-had http://www.usefulsecurity.com/2007/10/montavista-vision-2007/#comment-6 c-had Thu, 11 Oct 2007 13:24:33 +0000 http://www.usefulsecurity.com/?p=19#comment-6 Thanks for the comment. We all really appreciate the work you guys are doing in Japan for SELinux on embedded devices. Anyone who wants to use SELinux in the embedded space will benefit. I personally am very grateful for the sebusybox work and all the modifications to the libraries and kernel (such as the improved read/write performance patches) to make embedded SELinux possible. Thanks for the comment. We all really appreciate the work you guys are doing in Japan for SELinux on embedded devices. Anyone who wants to use SELinux in the embedded space will benefit. I personally am very grateful for the sebusybox work and all the modifications to the libraries and kernel (such as the improved read/write performance patches) to make embedded SELinux possible.

]]> Comment on Montavista Vision 2007 by Yuichi Nakamura http://www.usefulsecurity.com/2007/10/montavista-vision-2007/#comment-5 Yuichi Nakamura Thu, 11 Oct 2007 04:31:26 +0000 http://www.usefulsecurity.com/?p=19#comment-5 oops, woring -> working .. oops, woring -> working ..

]]> Comment on Montavista Vision 2007 by Yuichi Nakamura http://www.usefulsecurity.com/2007/10/montavista-vision-2007/#comment-4 Yuichi Nakamura Thu, 11 Oct 2007 04:22:33 +0000 http://www.usefulsecurity.com/?p=19#comment-4 Hi. I am excited to hear that people are woring SELinux for embedded devices. Some Japanese companies and people are also porting SELinux and working together. You can see what we are doing below. http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php?TODO_en Hi.
I am excited to hear that people are woring SELinux for embedded devices.
Some Japanese companies and people are also
porting SELinux and working together.
You can see what we are doing below.
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php?TODO_en

]]> Comment on Preventing Disclosure by c-had http://www.usefulsecurity.com/2007/08/preventing-disclosure/#comment-3 c-had Wed, 22 Aug 2007 14:29:51 +0000 http://www.usefulsecurity.com/?p=15#comment-3 I'm sorry you couldn't understand some of the parts. If you have any specific questions, please post them and I'll do my best to answer them. I’m sorry you couldn’t understand some of the parts. If you have any specific questions, please post them and I’ll do my best to answer them.

]]> Comment on Preventing Disclosure by Daniel http://www.usefulsecurity.com/2007/08/preventing-disclosure/#comment-2 Daniel Fri, 17 Aug 2007 16:08:58 +0000 http://www.usefulsecurity.com/?p=15#comment-2 I couldn't understand some parts of this article nting Disclosure at Useful Security, but I guess I just need to check some more resources regarding this, because it sounds interesting. I couldn’t understand some parts of this article nting Disclosure at Useful Security, but I guess I just need to check some more resources regarding this, because it sounds interesting.

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